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This final chapter gives an overview of the main conclusions and policy implications of this
study on institutional change and Poland's economic performance since the 1970s, and an
attempt is made to answer the main question of this thesis: Tb what extent have incentives and
transaction costs changed in the Polish economy and influenced econonric pe(ormance in the
peiod 1970-2000 and how can these changes be explained with the help of New Institutional
Economics? Two periods were taken into consideration. The socialist system, which existed
until 1989, and the period of market construction since 1990. The main question was divided
into sub-questions. Concerning the socialist system, to what extent can transaction costs
and incentives explain its demise, and how did they create the conditions for institutional
change towards a market economy? How did the situation at the end of the socialist system
influence economic performance at the beginning of the 1990s, and how did institutional
change proceed and transaction costs and incentives develop during the 1990s?
Tools of New Institutional Economics (NIE) have been applied in order to try to find an
answer to the research question and analyse the process of institutional change. NIE ana-
lyses economic problems from a multidimensional point of view. A focal point was how the
"legacy of the past" can be taken into account when explaining the decline of the socialist
system in Poland and analysing the process ofinstitutional change in the 1990s.
8.1 .  Summary o f  main  f ind íngs and conc lus ions
Formal and informal institutions (rules of the game) provide incentives for economic activi-
ty. Thus, when institutions change, incentives for economic activity also change. Thansaction
costs influence the payoft's of undertaking economic activity, and determine which type of
governance structure is the most efficient. The level of transaction costs is influenced not
only by institutions influencing the value in the public domain, but also by "hardware" like
physical infrastructure and by enforcement of the rules of the game by "institutional gover-
nance". Institutions hould be stable and reduce uncertainty, in order to stimulate economic
activity. However, inefficient institutions may survive, as people get used to them (mental
models), not all mistakes are uncovered, and strong interest groups may defend a status quo.
Chapter 8
In general, high transaction costs negatively influence economic activity, while the same
counts for weak incentives. But when transaction costs are high and incentives strong, the
influence on economic activity depends on which factor has the strongest influence.
Generally speaking, a planned economy can function appropriatety at early stages of
economic development or when market institutions are not developed or fail. Thus, just
after World War II the model of central planning could provide satisfactory economic per-
formance, especially in the period of post-war reconstruction. However, when the number
of transactions increase, the planned economy is expected to face increasing (marginal)
transaction costs, as there are diseconomies of scale to planning. Then a more decentra-
lised economic system, like a market economy, is needed to lower transaction costs. When
transaction costs increase, there is larger value in the public domain, negatively influencing
incentives for productive activity, as more opportunities for rent-seeking appear. This is
a theoretical explanation for the economic stagnation in Soviet:lype Economies (STEs) that
appeared ín the 1970s and 1980s.
The socialist system was inefficient compared to developed market economies. A question
is why inefficient institutions in socialist countries could survive for such a long time. Until
the 1960s economic performance in STEs was at an acceptable level. When economic
problems appeared, people had already got used to the system. Furthermore, the commu-
nist Party in fact monopolised information, and had a strong ideological commitment to the
socialist system. The influence of the Soviet Union limited the room for change in Poland
to a large extent. Due to control of media, many mistakes remained uncovered. When the
power monopoly of the Communist Party was broken, market institutions that would in-
crease efficiency could be introduced. However, there is a free-rider problem with introducing
them, as market institutions have features of a public good. This is because they are acces-
sible for free without reducing the opportunities for use by others. Self-interest and distrust
make the problem bigger, while trust and process-regarding preferences (e.g. ideology) can
overcome the free rider problem. However, even when the free-rider problem is overcome,
there remains uncertainty about the outcome of institutional change. No-one is able to com-
pletely grasp the complex nature of institutional change or foresee which institutions are
most efficient, because of many unknowns, while much can go wrong in the process of cre-
ation and implementation.
It is expected that transaction costs increase when the introduction of market institu-
tions is speeded up. When there is high uncertainty about institutional change, people fatl
back on mental models developed under the old system, leading to adverse reactions to the
incentives given by developing market institutions. This creates an institutional disequi-
l ibrium. As many people had "system-specific" skil ls and contacts, they had an interest in
protecting old (inefficient) institutions, which slowed down institutional change. Thus, for
a certain period old "degenerating" institutions were l ikely to co-exist with new developing
institutions. This was accompanied by lack of certain institutions (institutional vacuum).
Furthermore, value in the publíc domain is expected to increase. During the privatisa-
tion process the opportunities for rent-seeking increased, and there were problems with the
enforcement of market rules of the game as "institutional governance" was weak. The in-
creasing transaction costs and adverse incentives may have contributed to the fall in output
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Generally speaking, transaction costs increased and incentives weakened through time
in the socialist system. This was a consequence of the system weakening from classical ,
socialism, via reform socialism to "decaying" socialism. Increasing transaction costs and
weakening incentives contributed to deteriorating economic performance, and, together
with other factors like the large foreign debt and the extensive growth path, resulted in eco-
nomic stagnation. In the period of classical socialism, which lasted more or less until the end
of the 1960s, transaction costs were relatively low and incentives relatively strong, as the
Central Committee had an encompassing interest in good economic performance and public
property and planning were "strong". In the period of reform socialism, which in Poland
started in the 1970s, transaction costs increased and incentivesweakened. This is connected
with the weakening of the planned economy, making the solving of the allocation problem
more difficult. Reforms and decentralisation de facto led to a dispersion of the characteristics
of property rights. In other words, lower levels in the hierarchy obtained part of usus (the right
to use) and usus fructus (the right to pick the fruits). As a consequence, in accordance
with what Olson argues, there was a change from encompassing interest to narrow interest.
Tire Central Committee had an interest to look at total economic performance, while indivi-
duals were interested rather in maximising their own welfare, eventually at the cost of overall
economic performance. Furthermore, the dispersion of property rights made it more unclear
who was in control over property rights, while the principal-agent problem increased in
a situation where it became more unclear who is the principal. Thus, it can be argued that
value in the public domain increased, leading to increased rent-seeking, higher transaction
costs and weaker incentives for productive economic activity.
The socialist system was adaptively inefficient. The institution of public property pro-
vided weak incentives for innovation, since benefits became public property and costs and risk
were born by the innovator. Another reason for adaptive inefficiency was the impossibiliry
of experimenting with different forms of property rights, as state ownership was sacrosanct.
Communist ideology had never been very strong in Poland, and the Gierek administra-
tion tried to motivate people with economic incentives. This supported a development o-
wards narrow interest. Furthermore, support was "bought" by promising higher standards
of l iving and a social contract of solving polit ical confl icts non-violently. Investment and
consumption was financed by foreign loans. However, the strategy of building up industry
for exports failed due to various reasons. This may not have been so much the result of
the waste of investment due to weak incentives, as the oil crises and strong internal demand
negatively influenced opportunities for exports. The oil crises of 1973 and 1979 caused
Western economies to enter a recession, lowering the denrand Íbr Polish export products.
On the other hand, the increased expectations of society had to be fulfilled. Because of this
many products were not exported, as they were consumed on the domestic market. This
created a problem with repaying the foreign debts. Belief in the system started to weaken as
economic problems continued, especially towards the end of the 1970s. During this period
the labour movement in the form of Solidarity gained much influence, weakening the power
of the Conrmunist Party.
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The 1980s were a period of "decaying" socialism, where the economic policy seemed to
be "keep the boat from sinking". Thansaction costs increased more and more, and incen-
tives weakened. By way of Martial Law, which went into force on 13'h December 1981, an
attempt was made to break the power of the, by that time, legal labour union Solidarify. It
is difficult to find out whether it was the Soviet Union that inspired this or not, but as a con-
sequence the Communist Party itself weakened very much. Many members had been active
in Solidarity, and in 1982 many people left the Party. After a while labour again gained more
power, and in the process of reform attempts in 1982 and after, labour and management of
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) obtained more influence. In other words, they had more
control over the characteristics of state property. As a result, property rights were more
,vaguely defined, leading to more value in the public domain. From 1982 an attempt was
made to introduce more market into the economy, and the system of directive planning was
abolished. Plan bargaining was replaced by regulation bargaining, which was accompanied
by higher transaction costs. Shortages increased, which led to higher transaction costs from
the sides of both producers and consumers. Theoretically, in a planned economy there are
no transaction costs involved in activities such as stock procurement and selling the product.
However, due to shortages it was never clear how much of the needed input could be ob-
tained at what moment. This led to hoarding and the development of an informal market
between firms, accompanied by high transaction costs. Also many other transaction costs in-
creased. For consumers the consequence of shortages was that more and more often queu-
ing and informal markets became the distribution mechanism. It was quite common that
people had to queue 2-3 hours per day for the necessities of life. Such a situation was frus-
trating, and contributed to general dissatisfaction. Beliefin the socialist system weakened, al-
so among members of the Communist Party. In other words, the institutional disequilibrium
became larger.
The weakening of the socialist system by way of de facto dispersion of properfy rights,
weakening of the Communist Party, the abolit ion of central planning and the disappear-
ance of the belief in the systent were factors that created a situation of "decaying" socialism
in the 1980s. Tiansaction costs increased, incentives weakened, and economic stagnation
seemed to be a permanent feature. This created fertile ground for the creation of a market
economy in the 1990s. Economic factors alone cannot explain the direction of change. The
development of an economic interest among the ruling elites in a more market-oriented sys-
tem was important. This, and the strong labour movernent, lowered the political transaction
costs of change significantly. However, the non-interference of the Soviet Union in Polish
internal affairs also lowered these political transaction costs.
The situation at the end of the 1980s was one of neither plan nor market. With the
peaceful power transfer to the Solidarity movement in l9Íi9, when a coalition with the Com-
munists was formed, the task of the Soli<Jarity led government was to develop a program
to impr<lve economic performance. As transaction costs increased and incentives weak-
ened under socialism, an implicit aim of transÍbrmation was to lower transaction costs and
strengthen incentives. Although theoreticaliy there may have been other options, it can be
argued that the construction of a market was chosen as there were no other t'easible alter-
natives. Reforming socialism was not a real alternative, as there was no-one to do this iob.
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The reformers were quite optimistic about the expected results of the Balcerowicz plan un-
der which a market economy would be introduced in a short period. \ryith the advantage of
hindsight, the tools of NIE can be used to explain why the fall in output was larger than
expected at the beginning of the 1990s, and why Poland's economy started to grow again
after a short recession in comparison to other transforming former STEs.
As informal institutions change more slowly than formal institutions, mental models de-
veloped under the old system play an important role in the development of the new system
(path-dependency). This means that fast institutional change is difficult. Theoretically, for-
mal rules can be changed at once, but implementation takes time because economic subjects
have to learn, interpret and apply the new rules and to change their behaviour. Institution
building and the creation of "institutional governance" is very costly (high fixed transaction
costs of institutional change), which implies that these sources cannot be used for other pur-
poses, negatively influencing economic activity. Although the Polish transformation was
called "shock-therapy" as opposed to gradualism, these labels are not proper. Some institu-
tions changed quickly, while others changed slowly. Thus, the label "shock" or "gradual" de-
pends on which institutions we are talking about.
The development path towards a relatively strong market economy was not obvious, as
examples of fornrer Soviet republics show. An important factor strengthening the economic
system immediately was the macroeconomic stabilisation policy in the form of price and
trade liberalisation. Although this caused a deepening of the recession in 1990-1991 on the
one hand, it reduced the opportunities for rent-seeking activities created by price regula-
tions and reduced the remaining shortages immediately. Price liberalisation means the pri-
vatisation of property rights (characteristics of property) that the government possessed
with respect to price regulation, stimulating the development of a market economy. Tiade
liberalisation provided strong incentives for small business to develop, while they faced low
transaction costs, as l itt le regulation existed. As a result, a private sector was firmly estab-
lished. When opportunities for rent-seeking are reduced (lower value in the public domain),
wealth maximising individuals use their efforts for productive rather than redistributive
activit ies.
Uncertainfy about future institutional change was very high at the beginning of the
1990s, while the economic system faced an institutional vacuum and an institutional dis-
equil ibrium. A mix of socialist and market institutions existed and many market institutions
existed in an "embryonic" form or did not exist at all. When there is uncertainty, economic
actors fall back on their mental models, which in this case took shape under socialism. Such
a situation created many adverse incentives for economic behaviour and led to high trans-
action costs in economic exchange in the process of institutional change (e.g. privatisation)
and restructuring of SOEs. As a consequence, output declined. This effect was streng-
thened by factors such as a lack of social capital and a lack of skil ls needed for a market
econonly. However, due to the immediate syslem strengthening, the fall in output was nof
as deep as it could have been.
Thansition has come to its end when a "nonnal" economic system exists where transaction
costs are low and incentives are strong, while informal institutions upport formal institutions.
Although many steps in this direction have been made, transition still proceeds in many fields.
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An example is logistic development, where Poland lags 10 to 30 years behind developed
market economies. However, the development of logistics creates opportunities for f inding
transaction cost lowering solutions and provides incentives for step-by-step institutional im-
provement. It is suggested that small f irms should start to co-operate with each other, in or-
der to survive increasing competition from larger companies offering logistic services. This
seems also to be necessary, as the "institutional vacuum" is becoming smaller with the in-
troduction and implernentation of many standards (e.g. health, safety and environmental
standards) in the process of E,U accession, increasing the costs to smaller f inns relatively
faster than to larger firms.
At the beginning of the 1990s transaction costs to SOEs increased, while small newly es-
tablished private business faced low transaction costs and strong incentives. When property
rights became more certain, the institutional vacuum became smaller and part of the (pri-
vatised) state sector adapted to the new circumstances, causinp transactioÍl costs to decline.
A good example of a strengthening institution leading to lower transaction costs is the banking
sector. However, as is suggested by empirical researcl'r (see the Appendix), in the second
half of the 1990s ome transaction c:osts increased, at least for small f irms. It may be that the
closing of the institutional vacuum, e.g. in the form of the introduction and enforcement of
new taxes as well as environmental and health regulations posed problems for them. The
data also suggest increasing transaction costs for firms rvith more than 20 employees. These
tt'ansaction costs concern inefl icient public administration, unclear laws, law enforcement,
the process of creating legislation, corruption, theft, and increasing problems with collecting
payments from trade partners. Irurthermore, trust and the propensity to co-operate remain
low. Tiust in different levels of government among entrepreneurs is very low, posing a rhreat
to continuing economic growth. Some trust in banks, as well as process-based (personal)
trust in suppliers and clients, exists, suggesting some prospects for developing new eco-
nomic ventures.
8.2 .  Some impÍ íca t ions
Tools of NIE have been used to analyse svsten change in Poland sirrce thc i970s It has
helped to explain why the sc-rcialist system stagnated economically, and how weakening incen-
tives and increasing transaction costs cc.ntributed to the demise of the system, being an
explanatory variable in additicrn to polit ical factors. Furthermore, it explaius why the trans-
fornration strafegy was accompanied by a decline in output, and why the ecorromy entcred
a path of economic growth rather quickly. it also helps to irrdicate which clrallenges have
come up that may harnper future economic growth.
A question is horv future institutional change wil l proceed. A market has been inrro-
duced, generally speaking lowering transacÍion costs and strengthening incentives compared
to the socialist system when the economic system strengthened in the 1990s. However, al-
though uncertainty about the direction of institutional change has been reduced signifi-
cantly, there is sti l l  a long way to go as only thirteen years have passed since the introduc-
tion of the Balcerowicz plan. As much change sti l l  has to take place, uncertainty remains.
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Summary and Conclusions
Among others, weak "institutional governance", interest groups and a lack of transparency
hamper the introduction of more efficient institutions.
Poland's efforts for EU accession create incentives for the development of strong insti-
tutions and good governance practices. At the moment (the year 2003) Poland is in the pro-
cess of preparing accession to the European Union. In fact, this is also a process of institu-
tional change accompanied by many uncertainties. There seems to be less uncertainty in this
process than at the beginning of the 1990s, because there are established EU institutions to
refer to and adaptation to EU institutions has been proceeding for many years. However,
the existing mental models, which still find their roots in the socialist system, as well as the
inefficient formal institutions and "institutional governance" still existing, create the danger
that an "inefficient copy" of EU institutions will be introduced. This is not an unrealistic
scenario, as in the last few years many laws have been passed and negotiations with the EU
have finished, of which hardly anyone can predict what will be the effect, simply due to the
huge amount of changes, not mentioning other factors. "Inefficient copies" of EU institu-
tions are more l ikely, if these institutions are introduced without taking Polish reality into
consideration.
Furthermore, EU institutions also have to be changed in the process of its enlargement,
creating much uncertainty. For this reason experience from the transformation to a mar-
ket economy gained up till now may be invaluable in facing the challenges created by the
aspirations of joining the ELJ. As EU accession implies a new kind of transformation,
lessons from the process of institutional change can be drawn, in order to prevent the type of
problems that came up at the beginning of the 1990s. Although many firms are prepared
for changes, due to the proceeding transformation, many are likely to have to restructure
and to invest in new trade relations when Poland joins the common market. In the short-run
there may be negative economic effects, while positive economic effects will be felt only in
the medium-term as a result of evolutionary institutional change, under the condition that
Poland is able to use the opportunities created by EU membership.
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